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John M. Cooper, Reason and Emotion: Essays on Ancient Moral Psychology
and Ethical Theory (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), xvi + 588
pp., £16.95, ISBN 0 691 05875 X (pbk).
This book usefully collects twenty-three essays of which two are previously
unpublished while the others are reprinted or slightly revised. They are
devoted exclusively to ethics, with seven articles on Socrates and Plato,
twelve on Aristotle and four on Hellenistic Philosophy. With so much schol-
arly work being published on ancient philosophy during the last couple of
decades, one sometimes wonders how much of it will still be read one hundred
years from now. Will it disappear from view in the way in which, for example,
so much published in nineteenth century German periodicals is now largely
ignored? The writings of John Cooper probably have a better chance than
most of still being read at the end of the present century. These essays are char-
acterised by clarity, philosophical rigour, and thorough knowledge of the texts
and secondary literature. They present reasonable and stimulating interpreta-
tions of the texts that deserve the closest consideration. Altogether they repre-
sent what should be an enduring contribution to the study of ancient
philosophy.
While, as I said, the writing is usually lucid, it occasionally expands into
needless verbosity. Consider the following sentence: ‘this knowledge is nec-
essarily a single, comprehensive theory of human nature and human life, unat-
tainable except when a permanent, unshakable shift takes place in the state of
one’s mind — in one’s overall grasp of the value of everything that actually is
of value for a human being’ (p. 97, my italics). As far as I can see, all of the
italicised words and phrases in this sentence could have been omitted without
losing anything of importance. Likewise, Cooper has a penchant for using
pairs of synonyms or near synonyms as adjectives when one would be quite
enough, as in ‘permanent, unshakable’ above.
On another point of language, I find it very puzzling that Cooper (or any-
body) translates Aristotle’s use of ‘theoria’ as ‘study.’ He says at one point
that, for Aristotle, the happiness of the gods consists in ‘excellent contempla-
tive study’ (233), thereby bringing out how inappropriate the translation is.
Does Aristotle’s god study? I think not.
The translation is also unsatisfactory for the theoria of human beings. To
study is to labour to acquire knowledge, not, as Aristotle uses it, to think of
what you already know for its own sake. A student studying for an
POLIS. Vol. 17. Issues 1 and 2, 2000
POLIS The Journal of the Society for Greek Political Thought
www.imprint-academic.com/polis
1 Philosophy Department, University College London, Gower Street, London WC1E
6BT. Email: r.heinaman@ucl.ac.uk
examination or a scholar who is said to be studying the French Revolution or
mathematics studies in order to attain knowledge. If a scholar retires and gives
up his scholarly work in mathematics he may well be able to think of what he
has come to know, but we no longer say that he is studying mathematics.
Granted, a student can study by reviewing what she already knows well
enough, but even in this case one studies for the purpose of reinforcing one’s
knowledge, and so in order to achieve an end distinct from the studying. Even
if there are cases where a person studies merely for the sake of studying and
not for the sake of acquiring knowledge or deciding whether to accept a pro-
posal, it is still different from what Aristotle means by ‘theoria.’ To think of
what one already knows with no further cognitive end in view — the referent
of ‘theoria’ for human beings (1177b19–20, for example) — is not to study.
For Aristotle, the highest level of intellectual attainment for a person is not a
movement towards the possession of a potentiality, a quality, but the contem-
plation of what is already known, the actualization of potential knowledge. It
is not a movement towards some further goal, as study is a movement towards
a further goal, even if the person engaged in studying does not do it for the
sake of that goal.
In the remainder of this review I will discuss some points of interpretation
on which I am not convinced by Cooper’s arguments for his position, paying
special attention to his paper ‘Contemplation and Happiness in Aristotle:
A Reconsideration’ which revises the account of Aristotle’s views on happi-
ness found in his well known book, Reason and Human Good in Aristotle.
I
Cooper correctly points out that ancient ethical theories devoted themselves
to the examination of moral psychology and virtues of character much more
than contemporary ethics. But he exaggerates his case. He says (x):
Ethics meant more than, indeed something different from, rules of behavior.
Ethics was good character and what that entailed . . . Ethical theory was the
philosophical study of the best way to be, rather than any principles for what
to do in particular circumstances or in relation to recurrent temptations . . .
Ancient moral philosophy . . . investigated the human person first and fore-
most. It studies the specific capacities and powers, the different interests
and desires, that human beings by nature develop or are born with, and how
one ought to limit, arrange, and organize those for the best. [my italics]
When applied to Aristotle (as Cooper does in his paper ‘Remarks on Aris-
totle’s Moral Psychology’) this is misleading. Cooper says that Aristotle sees
‘moral theory [as] based on the virtues, rather than on moral rules or other
principles of behavior’ (237). Of course, Aristotle does study virtues and
vices of character, but it is false to say that this is something completely differ-
ent from the discussion of rules of behaviour. Aristotle’s general explanation
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of a virtue of character is that it is a mean because it aims at what is intermedi-
ate in passion and action (1107a3–6, 1109a20–24). Virtue of character (in
general) is explained in terms of a certain kind of behaviour. So with regard to
the question of what a virtue is, it is the behaviour that is basic, not the virtue.
That is, as always with Aristotle, it is the actuality (behaviour) that is basic,
not the potentiality (virtue) which is explained in terms of that actuality
(Meta. 1049b12–17; De Anima 415a14–20; NE 1122b1, 1140a2–5;
Protrepticus B83).
Likewise, when Aristotle explains specific virtues, he does so by describ-
ing how those with the virtue feel and act, which also specifies how people
ought to act. Some of these descriptions may not yield rules of action, but
some of them do. And the fact that such rules will have a degree of vagueness
and require adjustment to particular cases does not mean that they are not
rules. Aristotle’s discussion of potentially conflicting rules of behaviour in
NE IX.2 shows that their existence is compatible with need to take particular
circumstances into account.
Again, Cooper’s assertion that, for Aristotle, ethics deals with ‘the best way
to be, rather than any principles for what to do in particular circumstances’
draws a false contrast. For Aristotle, being for a human being is primarily a
matter of doing and acting in certain ways, that is, of actualities, and only sec-
ondarily a matter of having certain qualities such as virtues and vices of char-
acter which are merely potentialities. Cooper correctly says that for Aristotle,
ethics ‘studies the specific capacities and powers’ of human beings, but,
again, a capacity or power must be explained in terms of the activity for which
it is the capacity or power. Which in the case of virtues and vices of character
means that, as capacities or potentialities, they must be explained in terms of
the kinds of passions and behavior that actualize them. It is the kind of behav-
iour that is explanatorily basic. This is not true for what is nowadays called
‘virtue ethics.’
II
Sometimes Cooper finesses his interpretation into inconsistency or unclarity.
I will mention two examples from his papers on Plato.
A. In his paper ‘The Psychology of Justice in Plato’ Cooper tries to explain
both why the philosophers in Plato’s Republic agree to rule and why they do
so with reluctance. There is a well known problem in the Republic arising
from the fact that Plato apparently wants to maintain the following three
propositions:
i It always benefits one to be just, i.e., in effect, justice is good in itself
and injustice is evil in itself.
ii Ruling is an intrinsic evil.
iii For the philosophers, ruling is doing what is just.
(ii) is required, Plato thinks, because when those in control of the government
of a city love to rule and regard it as a good, the inevitable result is disunity for
the city arising from competition for political power. But if (ii) is true, then it
appears that by ruling, by doing what is just, the philosophers secure an evil
for themselves rather than a benefit, thus contradicting (i).
While many have tried to resolve the problem by arguing that Plato does not
accept (ii), Cooper, at least initially, rejects (i). Plato identifies the good with
rational order. The philosophers, Cooper explains, have as their ultimate goal
not their own good, but the realization of good in the world as a whole. As a
philosopher-king, what matters most to me is not that I should instantiate the
good as much as possible, but that the world as a whole should instantiate the
good as much as possible. In agreeing to rule, the philosophers act rationally
because they choose to act so as to instantiate the good in the world as a whole
to the greatest degree possible, thereby achieving their ultimate goal. The phi-
losopher ‘recognizes a single criterion of choice: what, given the circum-
stances, will be most likely to maximize the total amount of rational order in
the world as a whole?’ (145).
Despite the fact that the philosophers achieve their ultimate goal by choos-
ing to rule, they agree to rule with reluctance because they thereby choose a
life that is worse than another available to them. The best life would consist in
exhibiting rational order in their own lives to the highest degree possible by
devoting themselves to intellectual work. ‘Hence if the degree of the philoso-
pher’s eudaimonia is judged by comparison with this ideal, Plato’s philoso-
phers will settle for a less flourishing existence than they might have had’
(147). Thus, in this case, justice does not pay and (i) does not hold. The philos-
ophers would be better off by refusing to rule and devoting themselves exclu-
sively to contemplation. That is why they agree to rule with reluctance.
So on the one hand we have the philosophers’ guiding rule of action, their
ultimate end: always act so as to maximize the good — rational order — in the
world as a whole. On the other hand, we have the best life, eudaimonia, for a
human being: ‘no other life could be so good as this one,’ viz. the life devoted
to contemplation alone which would allow an individual to exemplify rational
order in his own life to the highest possible degree (147). When it comes to the
philosophers’ decision to rule, eudaimonia and the ultimate end part
company.
But then, immediately after this explanation of the philosophers’ reluctance
to rule, Cooper takes it back by saying that the philosophers who choose ‘to
spend some of the time in the cave,’ i.e. who agree to rule, ‘would be the hap-
piest and most flourishing men there ever in fact can be’ (147). ‘If the degree
of one’s eudaimonia is measured by how close one comes to realizing one’s
ultimate end,’ viz. promoting rational order in the world as a whole (as
opposed to promoting rational order in one’s own life), a philosopher who
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chose contemplation alone ‘would be less eudaimon than he would have been
by living the mixed political and intellectual life’ (147).
Well, it cannot be both. Cooper first divorces the ultimate end of the philos-
ophers from their own eudaimonia, and then explains their eudaimonia in
terms of achieving their ultimate end. Either (a) eudaimonia is determined by
the degree to which one exhibits rational order in one’s own life, or
(b) eudaimonia is determined by the degree to which one promotes rational
order in the world as a whole (the ultimate end). In order to explain the philos-
ophers’ reluctance to rule, Cooper first assumes (a), but then he immediately
takes it back and posits (b). Apart from the resulting unclarity as to what
exactly it is that Cooper wants to say, the adoption of (b) destroys his prior
explanation of the philosophers’ reluctance to rule. If the mixed life is indeed
‘the happiest and most flourishing’ available to a human being, why should
the philosophers, who know what the best life is, be reluctant to choose that
mixed life which is now said to be both their ultimate end and what is best for
themselves?
This will not be explained by saying that the philosophers’ reason for
choosing to rule is to achieve their ultimate end of promoting rational order in
the world as whole, and that the attainment of their own eudaimonia is never a
reason why they behave as they do. Suppose I know that doing x will achieve
my own happiness. If I nevertheless do x with reluctance, we hardly have a
satisfactory explanation of why I reluctantly do x by saying that the aim of
achieving my own happiness is not any part of the reason why I do x.
B. Another example of unclarity can be found in Cooper’s interesting essay
‘Greek Philosophers on Euthanasia and Suicide’ when (517–20) he discusses
Republic 406–7.2 Plato has been understood to say that anyone who is unable
to perform their assigned work that contributes to the wellbeing of the city as a
whole should be allowed to die. Cooper begins by saying that Plato argues that
the question of whether those who are sick should receive medical treatment
depends on whether, if treated, they will be able to continue the work they
engaged in prior to their illness. This suggests the principle that for any citizen
A of Plato’s ideal city:
1. A should receive treatment only if such treatment will lead to A’s
resumption of the productive work that he does for the city.
Further, Socrates approves of the practice of the Asclepiads who refused to
treat people who would require prolonged care. A life that involved constant
care would not be worth living and would contribute nothing to the benefit of
the city as a whole. Hence, such a life would not be a good thing either for the
individual or for the polis.
2 I am not sure why Cooper pays no attention to Eudemian Ethics 1215b15–1216a10
in his discussion of Aristotle. Although the passage does not refer explicitly to suicide, it
does discuss situations in which the question arises as to whether existence is preferable
to non-existence.
The patient Socrates describes has to abandon permanently those activities
in which at once his own good in large part consists and the good of others is
advanced, and that is what Socrates thinks justifies saying that such a per-
son’s life is of no benefit either to himself or to others (519, my italics).
So:
2. If A must abandon his work, his life is of no benefit to himself or to
others.
And if, as Cooper says, Plato’s position is one of ‘requiring’ the death of such
a person, primarily on the grounds that such a life is of no benefit to A, and
secondarily on the grounds that such a life is of no benefit to the polis (519),
we can say that
3. If A must abandon his work, the polis requires that A be allowed to die
because, primarily, (i) A’s life is of no benefit to A, and, secondarily,
(ii) A’s life is of no benefit to the polis.
If this is correct, it entails that the whole of A’s good, the only benefit A
derives from life, is either his work or dependent on his work. Otherwise, the
loss of that work would not entail that A’s life was of no benefit to A.
But then there is a minor modification to (3). Cooper goes on to suggest that
A’s inability to perform his original job after treatment is not, after all, a suffi-
cient reason for allowing A to die. If after treatment A is incapable of perform-
ing his earlier job but can find some productive form of work, A should
receive treatment. What Plato really objects to are treatments that deprive the
patient ‘of any productive life at all. That is because . . . the patient, in order to
prolong his life, has to devote most of his time that might have been available
for productive activity . . . to staying alive’ (519). This suggests a slight
adjustment of (3) to:
4. If (after treatment) A must abandon his work and is unable to perform
any other job, the polis requires that A be allowed to die because (i) A’s
life is of no benefit to A, and (ii) is of no benefit to the polis.
Constant self-care excludes productive work and yields a life that is not worth
living. Hence, if after treatment someone could only stay alive by devoting all
of their time to tending their body, then that would not be a life worth living
and such a person should be allowed to die. Only disorders which can be dealt
with by shorter forms of treatment should be treated at all.
But it turns out that (4) is not quite right either because, Cooper says, ‘even
if it might seem quite certain . . . that a given patient would not in fact succeed
in finding anything useful to do, nothing in Socrates’ remarks suggests that’
such a person should be refused treatment and be allowed to die (519, my
italics).
Now we are left wondering what Cooper meant to say before. At the top of
the page (519), when principle 3 was in play, he had said:
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From the point of view of his own theory of the human good, Plato is not
guilty of heartlessly requiring the death of people who are no longer,
through no fault of their own, useful to society: the requirement [that they
die] is imposed equally, in fact primarily, for the good of the sick person
himself.
How is this compatible with what we are now told, that those whose lives are
no longer useful to society or themselves are not required to die?
If, as we are now told, those who are unable to make any contribution to the
good of the city are to be allowed to live as long as they do not have to devote
all their time to management of their disorder, what is the principle that
decides who lives and dies? It would appear that we are now at:
5. If anyone with some bodily disorder can go on living only if they must
devote all of their time to the management of their disorder, they should
be allowed to die.
This will allow, as Cooper now says, the unproductive person to go on living
provided that that person does not have to devote all available time to treat-
ment of his illness. But Cooper does not explain the rationale for (5) and it
contradicts his earlier statement that a life that cannot be devoted to work is of
‘no’ benefit to the individual as well as the state, and that that is what justifies
the requirement that such people die.
But even (5) turns out to be too strong since we are told next that nothing
that Plato says need be thought to apply to the elderly who have retired from
work (520):
In Plato’s republic, such persons, of whatever class, are due honor and
respect, and retain their place in the community as members of the house-
hold (or its equivalent for guardians and rulers) valued for their past ser-
vices and for their experience. The intrusive regimes that would undermine
the lives of persons of other ages and social roles would not necessarily do
so for these members of the community.
Maybe this is right, and this would explain the fact that at 498b–c Plato speaks
of the philosophers surviving into retirement.
But nothing in 406–7 supports it. Further, it is inadequate as a rationale for
treating the elderly in a special manner. What is the relevant difference
between the older A and the younger B that justifies allowing A to live and B
to die? The only principle which Cooper appears to suggest is that the elderly
are ‘due honor and respect, and retain their place in the community . . . valued
for their past services and for their experience’ (520). But why does this prin-
ciple apply to the elderly and fail to apply to the non-elderly? It is not only the
elderly who have experience and have rendered past services to the city, so if
the elderly are owed honour and valued for their past services and for their
experience, why should not those who are not elderly also deserve honour and
be valued for their past services and experience? And, therefore, why should
they not also be allowed to live?
Cooper says that the life of the non-elderly would be undermined by intru-
sive medical treatment while this would not necessarily be true for the elderly
(520). But in both cases the situation is that we have people who cannot pursue
their former (or any) line of work because of illness or injury or the incapaci-
ties of old age. In both cases, according to Cooper’s statements one page
before, what makes their lives worthwhile is now beyond them. If A is an
elderly person in such a position and B is a younger person in such a position,
how is it that medical treatment will ‘undermine’ the life of B but not under-
mine the life of A?
Once again, it is not easy to fit Cooper’s remarks on the elderly with what
was said previously. If, as previously asserted, one who is no longer able to
perform his work has a life that is of no benefit to himself as well as no benefit
to the polis, and hence such an individual is benefited by being allowed to die
(519: death ‘is for the good of the sick person himself’), why should the polis
not be similarly willing to benefit the elderly by allowing them to die if their
survival would require intrusive medical treatment?
III
I will examine in more detail Cooper’s paper ‘Contemplation and Happiness:
A Reconsideration,’ in which he presents a different interpretation of Aris-
totle’s account of happiness in the Nicomachean Ethics than he had offered in
his book, Reason and Human Good in Aristotle. I will put into brackets my
own comments on Cooper’s argument immediately after setting out a stage of
his argument.
In Reason and Human Good in Aristotle Cooper thought there was an
inconsistency between Book I’s commitment to moral virtue and Book X’s
commitment to contemplation, where he understood Book X to be recom-
mending a life of intellectual study that might resort to immoral action to
achieve its ultimate end. Now he argues that Aristotle’s views are consistent
and that Book X maintains that human happiness requires the exercise of all
the virtues, moral as well as intellectual. This avoids the undesirable result of
making Book X reject, without explanation, the position of Book I.
Here is Cooper’s argument. At the start of NE X.7 Aristotle says
(1177a12–17):
If happiness is activity in accordance with virtue, it is reasonable that it
should be in accordance with the best virtue. But this will be the activity of
the best thing in us . . . the activity of this [best thing] according to its proper
virtue will be complete eudaimonia. We have already said that this activity
is contemplative. [I use Cooper’s translation of ‘teleia’ as ‘complete’ even
though I think it is a mistranslation].
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If this means that happiness is excellent theoretical thinking of some sort,
Aristotle will be saying that excellent theoretical thinking is
the whole of what a person should aim ultimately at in his life, the sole thing
such that having and engaging in it makes his life happy. Nothing else but
this will make any independent contribution to the goodness of his life; in
particular, moral virtue will not (220).
[The extreme intellectualist view of Book X, which identifies eudaimonia
with contemplation alone, does not entail that Aristotle attaches merely
instrumental value to virtues or other goods, or that he does not believe that
they are essential to a happy life. Aristotle’s explanation of ‘complete’
(teleion) good at Nicomachean Ethics 1097a25–b6 (note especially
1097b2–4) as well as what he says about intrinsic value in many other pas-
sages makes it quite clear that even if any good other than eudaimonia is cho-
sen for the sake of eudaimonia, where (let’s suppose) eudaimonia is identified
with contemplation alone, an intrinsic good is chosen for its own sake inde-
pendently of its promotion of eudaimonia. So even if eudaimonia is contem-
plation alone, virtue of character and virtuous action, for example, may have
the intrinsic value that Aristotle assigns them. Furthermore, Aristotle draws a
clear contrast between happiness and the necessary conditions for happiness,
where the latter include intrinsic goods (NE 1099a31–b8, 27–28). Making
contemplation the sole constituent of eudaimonia is consistent with making
virtue and virtuous actions necessary conditions for happiness and hence
essential to the happy life. So Cooper’s intellectualist interpretation of Book
X in Reason and Human Good does not commit Aristotle to the inconsistency
that his paper is designed to overcome, insofar as this is understood as an
inconsistency between the identification of happiness with contemplation
alone and the assignment of intrinsic value to virtue and virtuous actions.
Perhaps Cooper is relying on his claim (216) that Aristotle makes happiness
the ‘only’ end for the sake of which we do everything that we do. But if this is
interpreted to imply that nothing besides happiness (contemplation, on the
intellectualist view) is viewed as an end, 1097a25–b6 along with many other
passages show that the interpretation is wrong.
Nor do I see how Cooper’s assertion of this inconsistency fits his acknowl-
edgement of the existence of intrinsic goods which are not part of happiness
elsewhere in his paper (219), or with what he says about happiness in a post-
script to his paper ‘Aristotle on the Goods of Fortune’ (309–11). There he
states that external goods such as friends are constituents of happiness insofar
as they are instrumental goods which make virtuous activity possible for a
person. But, he says, there are also intrinsic goods such as one’s children
which are not constituents of happiness but whose absence would destroy
one’s happiness. So Cooper here recognizes that something may be an intrin-
sic good which is essential to one’s happiness without being a constituent of
happiness. And it is not clear what precludes the intellectualist interpretation
of Book X similarly making virtue and virtuous activity intrinsic goods essen-
tial to happiness without being constituents of happiness.]
Cooper’s reason for rejecting his own earlier reading of the sentence as
identifying eudaimonia with contemplation alone is that the formulation is
similar to statements made in Book I, and he thinks that those statements in
Book I can be understood in a way that does not exclude the exercise of the
moral virtues as part of happiness. After offering an interpretation of the state-
ments in Book I Cooper will return to consider X.7, 1177a12–17 in light of
that interpretation.
In I.7 at the conclusion of the function argument Aristotle says
(1098a16–18):
[A] the human good turns out to be virtuous activity of soul, and
[B] if there is more than one virtue, [the human good turns out to be
activity] of the best and most complete (teleiotaten) virtue.
Whatever this claims about happiness with regard to the relation between vir-
tuous activity and the activity of the best virtue, it is reasonable to interpret
1177a12–17 in the same way.
What then is meant by 1098a16–18? Two clues are that (i) it is the conclu-
sion of the function argument and therefore should follow from that argu-
ment’s premises, and (ii) the conclusion is repeated elsewhere in Book I.
Taking up (ii) first, Cooper says that three statements which Aristotle
makes in Book I following the function argument (1100a4–5, 1101a14–16,
1102a5–6) paraphrase the conclusion of the function argument and use the
expression ‘complete virtue,’ where this clearly means comprehensive virtue
(all the virtues) rather than the single best virtue. Therefore the conclusion of
the function argument ought to be understood to affirm that happiness
includes virtuous activities of all types.
[Prima facie, it is certainly reasonable to expect all the statements of the
definition of happiness to make the same claim. But it is also prima facie rea-
sonable to expect that ‘complete virtue’ means the same in the four statements
of the thesis which use that phrase. Nor is it immediately obvious that both of
these expectations cannot be satisfied by the same interpretation. But, as we’ll
see below, Cooper argues that ‘complete virtue’ in 1098a16–18 means the sin-
gle best virtue, whereas ‘complete virtue’ in subsequent paraphrases
(1100a4–5, 1101a14–16 and 1102a5–6) refers to comprehensive virtue. Per-
haps the desideratum satisfied by Cooper’s interpretation is more important
than the desideratum satisfied by the alternative view, but the difference is not
overwhelming. In Cooper’s case, whereas the overall strategy of understand-
ing 1177a12–17 with the help of his interpretation of 1098a16–18 is based in
part on the presumption that the similarity of language between the two pas-
sages allows us to interpret one in terms of the other (220), he sets aside the
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similarity of language between 1100a4–5, 1101a14–16 and 1102a5–6 on the
one hand and 1098a16–18 on the other.
Cooper asserts that in 1100a4–5, 1101a14–16 and 1102a5–6, ‘Aristotle
says clearly that according to his theory happiness is activity of complete vir-
tue [that is, all of the virtues including moral virtues] . . . there is little doubt
that that . . . is what he intends’ (221).
Cooper makes two points to justify his confidence that 1100a4–5,
1101a14–16 and 1102a5–6 must be understood to be saying that eudaimonia
is the activity of all of the virtues (221, n. 7). First, he refers to 1099a17–20
and 1100b19–20 as passages which describe virtuous activities of all types as
included within happiness. 1099a17–20 says that the good man must take
pleasure in virtuous actions and 1100b19–20 says that the happy man will act
and contemplate ‘the things according to virtue’ (ta kat’ areten). But even if
the happy man must be morally good and take pleasure in virtuous actions it
does not follow that the exercise of all the virtues is happiness rather than
being a necessary condition for happiness.
I think that Cooper’s interpretation of 1100b19–20 is eminently reasonable,
especially when read in its context. But I do not believe that he has said any-
thing that must convince any reasonable intellectualist.
To justify his view of the three passages Cooper also states that
1098b22–1099b8 aims
to argue that his [Aristotle’s] theory makes all the features that different pre-
vious thinkers have identified one by one as essential to happiness, essential
to it: virtue, phronesis, sophia, pleasure, external prosperity. So his theory
of happiness was intended to make the exercise of sophia, the virtues of
character, and practical wisdom . . . all elements in the activity that . . . hap-
piness is (221, n. 7).
But even if Aristotle intends to make all of these factors essential to happi-
ness, this statement on its own proves nothing more than that all the virtues are
necessary conditions for happiness, and that entails neither that these virtues
nor that the exercise of these virtues are constituents of happiness. Indeed, in
the passage I quote Cooper appears to concede that something may be essen-
tial to happiness without constituting it since, while he says that virtue,
phronesis and sophia are essential to happiness, it is only the exercise of vir-
tue, phronesis and sophia that is said to constitute happiness.
Furthermore, if the statements in Book I which Cooper alludes to
(1099a17–20, 1100b19–20) support the assertion that Aristotle’s claims that
happiness is the exercise of ‘complete virtue’ at 1100a4–5, 1101a14–16 and
1102a5–6 mean that happiness is the exercise of all the virtues, why do those
passages not also show that 1098a16–18’s claim that happiness is the exercise
of ‘the most complete virtue’ means that happiness is the exercise of all the
virtues? No basis has been provided for distinguishing one of these passages
(1098a16–18) from the other three (1100a4–5, 1101a14–16, 1102a5–6), and
taking 1099a17–20 and 1100b19–20 as providing evidence on how to inter-
pret the use of ‘complete virtue’ in three passages but not in the other.
Cooper will correctly say that it is reasonable to take the three paraphrases
as restating the whole conclusion of the function argument. But the reason-
ableness of this is reduced when combined with Cooper’s view (see below)
that the conclusion of the function argument, which the paraphrases are sup-
posed to reproduce, does not explicitly say but merely implies that happiness
is the exercise of all the virtues.
As we will see next, Cooper argues that ‘most complete virtue’ in
1098a16–18 refers to the single best virtue. But as we’ll also see, two of those
arguments equally support the assertion that the reference to ‘complete virtue’
in 1100a4–5, 1101a14–16 and 1102a5–6 refers to the single best virtue.]
The phrase ‘most complete virtue’ also occurs in the conclusion of the func-
tion argument itself. But Cooper thinks it must be understood differently from
its use in the three paraphrases. Cooper rejects the view of Ackrill and Keyt
according to which ‘most complete virtue’ in 1098a16–18 refers to the combi-
nation of all the virtues. Against this proposal, Cooper argues as follows:
First, this construal of ‘best and most complete virtue’ is unnatural. Second,
Aristotle had previously explained (1097a25–b6) that by ‘most complete end’
he means ‘chosen always for itself alone and never for the sake of anything
else’ (223). So the most complete virtue is that virtue which is chosen for itself
alone and not for anything further. Book X will explain that wisdom satisfies
this criterion, and therefore ‘the most complete virtue’ is wisdom, and ‘there
seems no possibility for doubt . . . that it is this comparison which he is antici-
pating’ in 1098a16–18 (223). Third, in the fourth paraphrase of the conclusion
of the function argument at 1099a29–31 Aristotle asserts that he had identi-
fied happiness with ‘the best activities or with one of these, the best one’.
Unless this refers back to 1098a16–18, there is nothing for it to refer back to.
In particular, if by the best and most complete virtue [in 1098a16–18] he
means the sum–total of all the virtues . . . then nowhere in his account of
happiness has Aristotle previously [to 1099a29–31] said a word about the
best single activity and its role in happiness (224).
Therefore, the activity according to ‘the most complete virtue’ at 1098a16–18
must, given Aristotle’s view that wisdom is the best virtue, refer to the exer-
cise of wisdom.
[With regard to Cooper’s first argument, while it may be true that the inter-
pretation of Ackrill and Keyt gives an unnatural construction to the phrase
‘best and most complete virtue,’ that point, if correct, also applies to Cooper’s
own understanding of ‘complete virtue’ at 1100a4–5, 1101a14–16 and
1102a5–6. As we saw, Cooper claims that in these passages, as opposed to
1098a16–18, ‘complete virtue’ refers not to a single virtue (wisdom, as Book
X will reveal) but to the sum total of all the virtues. So if the unnaturalness of
the Ackrill-Keyt understanding of ‘most complete virtue’ at 1098a16-18 is a
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good point against their interpretation, it is also a good point against Cooper’s
understanding of ‘complete virtue’ at 1100a4–5, 1101a14–16 and 1102a5–6.
Cooper’s second argument also boomerangs against his own interpretation
of 1100a4–5, 1101a14–16 and 1102a5–6: if this is a good argument for taking
‘most complete virtue’ at 1098a16–18 to refer to a single virtue (wisdom), it is
also a good argument for construing ‘complete virtue’ at 1100a4–5,
1101a14–16 and 1102a5–6 as referring to a single virtue (wisdom) rather than
all the virtues. Cooper says nothing to distinguish 1098a16–18 from the other
three passages in a way that would justify the claim that Aristotle’s explana-
tion of ‘most complete’ at 1097a25–b6 shows what he means by ‘most com-
plete’ virtue at 1098a16–18 but does not show what he means by ‘complete’
virtue at 1100a4–5, 1101a14–16 and 1102a5–6.
Further, 1097a25–b6 offers an explanation not of ‘most complete’ but of
‘most complete end.’ It is not obvious that an explanation of ‘most complete
end’ can be used to explain what is meant by ‘most complete virtue’ in
1098a16–18 to yield the conclusion that the latter is wisdom.
Further, even if it can be so used, wisdom, like any virtue, state and potenti-
ality, should be chosen for the sake of the activity which ‘actualizes’ it (NE
1101b10–16; EE 1218b37–1219a18; Meta. 1051a4–15). So it is not true that
wisdom is not ‘chosen also for further goods it brings us’ (223). Cooper
claims (223) that Book X (1177b1–4, 12–18) affirms that ‘wisdom is chosen
for its own sake alone, and not . . . chosen also for further goods it bring us.’
But this is false. 1177b is not discussing intellectual virtue but intellectual
activity. Although modern commentators on Aristotle’s ethics habitually
fudge this distinction between potentiality (virtue) and actuality (thinking and
action), Aristotle regards it as of the utmost importance. 1177b argues that
contemplation rather than morally virtuous action is the primary form of hap-
piness. The potentialities that are intellectual virtue and virtue of character are
long gone as candidates for happiness. Early in Book I the Nicomachean Eth-
ics dismissed any claim on their part to be happiness (1095b29–1096a2,
1098b31–1099a7, 1101b10–12, I.12, 1169b28–31, 1173a14–15,
1176a33–35). Of course, Cooper is free to argue that wisdom is not chosen for
the sake of any other virtue while other virtues are chosen for the sake of
wisdom, and hence wisdom is the most ‘complete’ virtue, and that is all that
matters to him here. But it is not at all obvious that all virtues of character are
chosen for the sake of wisdom. Still, he might abandon the claim that wisdom is
not chosen for the sake of anything else and still argue that it is the virtue ‘cho-
sen most for its own sake and least for the sake of other good things’ (227).
With regard to Cooper’s third argument, while he says that at 1099a29–31
‘Aristotle says that on his theory as earlier stated’ (223, my italics) he identi-
fied happiness with either the best activities or with the best activity, Aris-
totle’s own words do not refer back to his theory as having been previously
stated. Aristotle’s words are ‘We say that these [the best activities] or one —
the best — of these is happiness.’ While, of course, Aristotle may be thinking
of what he said previously, he does not explicitly say that he is. For all Cooper
says, 1099a29–31 rather than 1098a16–18 may be the first passage in Book I
where Aristotle anticipates Book X’s identification of contemplation with
happiness.]
Besides the paraphrases, the other clue to understanding the claim at
1098a16–18 was that it is the conclusion of the function argument, ‘so one
would expect what it says to follow from its premises, or at any rate to be
related to them in such a way that one can see how on the basis of just these
premises Aristotle means to recommend just this conclusion’ (221).
In the function argument which leads up to 1098a16–18 Aristotle argues
that happiness must be an active exercise of our rational power, namely the
use of that power as it exists when perfected by its and our specific virtue,
because the good of any living thing consists in the perfected exercise of its
specific nature as the kind of thing that it is. And since (1098a4–5) our rational
power is complex, having several aspects and functions, the perfected exer-
cise of our specific nature will require several activities, the activities of the
virtues that perfect the several aspects and functions of our rational power.
Thus Aristotle’s argument seems to require the conclusion that happiness is
activity of complete virtue, i.e. activity of all the specifically human virtues,
the ones belonging to our rational capacities, and hence happiness includes
the activity of the moral virtues (222).
[In the function argument Aristotle says that
1. Eudaimonia appears to be the actuality of what has a logos (1098a3–4).
And since
2. What has a logos is double (1098a5),
3. The activity (energeia) according to what has a logos is also double
(1098a6).
So there are, according to (3), two activities of what has a logos — say,
activity1 and activity2. And it is clear that (1) is compatible with the statement
that activity1 and not activity2 is eudaimonia. Further, this fits perfectly with
1098a16–18, which first says that
A: Eudaimonia is activity according to virtue.
This recalls (1): eudaimonia is the actuality of what has a logos. Like (1), (A)
is compatible with the statement that activity1 and not activity2 is
eudaimonia. Aristotle then mentions the possibility that
4. There are several virtues,
which means (although Aristotle does not say it explicitly, it is presupposed
by [B] below) that
5. There are several activities of virtue.
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This recalls (2) and (3). There is more than one activity of virtue as there is
more than one actuality according to logos. Aristotle then draws an inference
from the assumption of the truth of (4) (and of course Aristotle believes that
(4) is true):
B: If there is more than one virtue, eudaimonia is the activity of the best
and most complete (teleiotaten) virtue
and therefore not the activity according to those virtues other than the best and
most complete, if we take Aristotle’s words to mean what they appear to say,
as Cooper is arguing they do not. (B) (activity1 — of the best and most com-
plete virtue — and not activity2 is eudaimonia) is obviously compatible with
(A) and hence with (1) as well. The argument itself, then, does not suggest, as
Cooper claimed, that eudaimonia is the exercise of all the virtues.
Remarkably, Cooper concedes as much. He first says (222) that the pre-
mises of Aristotle’s argument ‘most strongly suggest’ ‘that happiness is . . .
activity of specifically human nature perfected in all its relevant aspects,’
where this is understood to mean not that each such activity is happiness but
that all together constitute happiness. Later (225) he says that the conclusion
which strictly follows from the premises — ‘human good is activity of human
virtue’ — does not mention a plurality of virtues or virtuous activities.
‘Throughout, he has spoken of a work and a virtue for human beings as such.’
In fact, on Cooper’s account it will turn out that the claim that happiness
consists in activity according to all the virtues is made by none of Aristotle’s
statements. Rather, Cooper next argues, that proposal is merely implied by the
last clause of 1098a16–18.]
How should we interpret 1098a16–18 as a whole? Traditionally it has been
understood to say that
(1) eudaimonia consists in virtuous activity in general, or
(2) eudaimonia is the single activity of the best and most complete virtue
(wisdom),
where these statements are incompatible because (1) is understood to mean
that happiness is the combination of activities of all the virtues. Cooper thinks
it is a mistake to construe 1098a16–18 as offering these two distinct alterna-
tives. So construed the alternatives are incompatible, only (1) follows from
the preceding argument, and if it is offering two alternatives then Aristotle’s
restatements of the thesis elsewhere in Book I would wobble between assert-
ing (1) three times (1100a4–5, 1101a14–16, 1102a5–6), and asserting either
(1) or (2) in another passage (1099a29–31). But as restatements of
1098a16–18, we ought to be able to understand these four passages and
1098a16–18 as making the same claim.
[Note that Cooper is here arguing only that the two clauses of 1098a16–18
as traditionally understood should not be seen as offering incompatible
alternatives. For he will go on to argue that both clauses should be understood
differently, viz.
(1c) happiness is activity of human virtue
(2c) happiness is especially activity of the best and most complete
human virtue.
But now suppose that someone proposed that (2) should be interpreted
according to its apparent meaning, i.e. as Cooper himself interpreted it in his
Reason and Human Good:
(2a) happiness is activity of the best and most complete human virtue.
Cooper points out (225) that (1c) allows happiness to consist in the exercise of
just a single virtue. So understood, (1c) is compatible with (2a) since (2a)
entails (1c). They differ in that (1c) allows more activities of virtue to count as
happiness, but it does not say or entail that. So a decision to accept (2a) would
not mean the rejection of (1c). Nevertheless, they can be seen as alternatives
since (1c) allows what (2a) rules out. So whatever force there may be in Coo-
per’s objection to the traditional understanding of (1) and (2) on the basis of
the claim that the traditional interpretation makes them incompatible does not
apply to this plausible understanding of the two clauses of 1098a16–18. Fur-
ther, it is hardly implausible to understand 1099a29–31’s identification of
happiness with ‘the best activities or with one of these, the best one’ as a repe-
tition of 1098a16–18, or as offering alternatives.
Cooper’s second argument for saying that (1) and (2) are not offered as
alternatives is that (1) alone follows from the argument. But once we replace
the traditional reading with Cooper’s
(1c) happiness is activity of human virtue
it can easily be seen how Aristotle could have thought that (2) follows from
the argument. Let me quote 1098a16–18 again:
if that is so, (1c) happiness is activity of human virtue, and if (b) there is
more than one virtue, (2) of the best and most complete (teleiotaten) virtue.
(b) says in effect
(3) there are several virtues.
(1c) says eudaimonia is virtuous activity of soul. This follows from the func-
tion argument. (2) says that eudaimonia is virtuous activity of the best and
most complete virtue. (2) can be understood as an alternative to (1a) since the
former allows that activities of the virtues that are not the best count as
eudaimonia. But also, (2) can easily be seen as a conclusion following from
(1a) together with (3) plus the unstated but (to Aristotle) obvious
assumptions:
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(4) one of the virtues is the most complete (or perfect)
(5) the activity of the best virtue is the best activity.
(Cf. EE 1219a6–39, NE 1177a4–6, 12–13, Pol. 1323b13–18, Topics
116b12–22). So although
(2) eudaimonia is the single activity of the best and most complete virtue
(wisdom)
does not directly follow from the explicit premises of the function argument, it
can be said to follow from it when the conclusion of the function argument is
combined with assumptions which — to Aristotle — are obvious and which
he explicitly states elsewhere, including his discussion of eudaimonia in the
Eudemian Ethics. At the very least, there is no problem in seeing how (2) is
related to the premises of the function argument in the manner that Cooper
demands of his own interpretation, that is, how it is related to the premises ‘in
such a way that one can see how on the basis of just these premises Aristotle
means to recommend just this conclusion’ (221).
Cooper’s argument was that Aristotle could not wish to affirm (2) at the
conclusion of the function argument because it could not be thought to follow
from that argument. But it is not difficult to see how Aristotle could have
thought it did follow from that argument. Of course, on the proposal outlined
above (1c) and (2) are not presented as alternatives, but nothing I have said
rules out someone adopting the view that they are alternatives with the choice
depending on whether we can make the unstated assumptions I referred to.
They can say that, while Aristotle himself accepts those assumptions, at this
point where he is merely sketching his account of happiness (1098a20–22) the
issue is left open, and so, at this point, (1c) and (2) are presented as alterna-
tives still in play, both of which follow from the preceding argument, or can
easily be made to follow from that argument with the addition of obvious
assumptions.
Cooper’s third argument was that on the traditional interpretation the four
restatements of the conclusion of the function argument would have to be
understood as saying on three occasions (1100a4–5, 1101a14–16, 1102a5–6)
that happiness is the activity of complete, i.e. apparently comprehensive vir-
tue, and on another occasion (1099a29–31) saying that happiness is either the
combination of the best activities or the single best activity. And ‘this is surely
intolerable’ (224). But this argument rests on Cooper’s claims about the
meaning of ‘complete’ in the first three passages and we have already seen
that those arguments are questionable.]
Instead of (1) and (2) being offered as alternatives, Cooper thinks that here
in Book I, where Aristotle is simply sketching in outline his view of
eudaimonia,
(1) eudaimonia is activity of human virtue,
and
(2) eudaimonia is the single activity of the single virtue of wisdom
should be seen as expressing the same view, (1) more vaguely and (2) less
vaguely (and without wisdom being explicitly identified as the best virtue, as
it is in Book X).
All that strictly follows from the function argument (and what Aristotle
actually says) is the vaguer formulation that
(1) eudaimonia is the activity of human virtue.
But although the vaguer formulation — (1) — is therefore strictly compatible
with the statement that
(3) eudaimonia is the activity of a single virtue,
(3) cannot be what Aristotle intends by (1) since it would allow someone to
achieve eudaimonia by merely exercising one of the lesser virtues. To rule this
out Aristotle adds (2), saying that eudaimonia is especially the exercise of the
best of the virtues. What he means to say is that eudaimonia is the activity of
all of the virtues but especially the activity of the best of the virtues, an activ-
ity which ‘completes’ the activities of the other virtues.
While 1098a16–18 ‘says’ that happiness is activity of all the virtues, ‘it
says this indirectly and by implication, as following from the insistence that
happiness requires activity of the best and most complete virtue’ (226).
[This interpretation certainly strains credibility in requiring the content of
Aristotle’s claim about the identity of happiness to be largely conveyed by
implication rather than explicit assertion. Likewise it requires acceptance of
the claim that Aristotle could use ‘x = y’ to mean ‘x [which is many other
things] is especially y.’ It makes Aristotle out to be very clumsy in expressing
his position on the most important issue addressed by the Nicomachean Eth-
ics. (Of course, given the variety of interpretations Aristotle’s text has given
rise to, one could say that this last point is not much of an objection to Coo-
per’s view).
As noted above, Cooper had said that one ‘would expect [the conclusion of
the function argument] to follow from its premises, or at any rate to be related
to them in such a way that one can see how on the basis of just these premises
Aristotle means to recommend just this conclusion.’ True, but surely an inter-
pretation which allows the conclusion of the function argument to follow from
the premises is prima facie more plausible than an interpretation which
imposes the more tenuous relation described in Cooper’s second disjunct. So
in this respect Cooper’s interpretation is at a disadvantage. Equally, any inter-
pretation which, unlike Cooper’s, has Aristotle explicitly state the conclusion
of the function argument is prima facie preferable to one that does not.
However, Cooper sometimes speaks in a way that obscures the point that
his own interpretation does not satisfy these conditions. He says (224) that he
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is proposing an interpretation where the conclusion follows ‘reasonably’ well
from the premises, and where the conclusion ‘amounts’ to saying that happi-
ness is activity of ‘the sum total of the moral and intellectual virtues.’ This
does not prepare us for the outcome where the conclusion does not ‘strictly’
follow from the premises, and where the conclusion ‘amounts’ to asserting
Cooper’s conclusion merely in the sense that is implied by what Aristotle
explicitly says.
One point which Cooper offers as, hopefully, a minor consideration in sup-
port of his interpretation and against the rival view appeals to the fact that
Aristotle says in I.7 that he is presenting a rough sketch of his account of hap-
piness. Hence, Cooper claims, ‘one ought not to expect him to be offering a
choice between clear and discrete, incompatible alternatives at this point.
Rather, the alternatives ought to be related as vaguer and less vague alterna-
tives of the same view’ (225).
Where Cooper thinks these ‘oughts’ come from I do not know. Both his
view and the alternative views of 1098a16–18 mentioned above are in the
same boat in that the identity of the most complete virtue is left unspecified
until Book X. And that may be all the vagueness that Aristotle has in mind. If
not, there is still no reasonable way to get from the claim that Aristotle is pre-
senting his view in general terms to the conclusion not that Aristotle’s view,
but that the propositions contained in the expression of his view [(1) & (2)],
ought to be seen as more and less vague expressions of the same view.
Equally, there is no way to derive the conclusion that they ought not to be seen
as ‘clear and discrete, incompatible alternatives.’ It is consistent with (1) and
(2) being more and less vague expressions of the same view that the view
expressed not be vague. And it is consistent with (1) and (2) being clear, dis-
crete and incompatible alternatives that the assertion ‘(1) or (2)’ leaves it
undetermined — vague — what Aristotle is saying.]
As to why 1098a16–18 says that happiness is the activity of the most com-
plete virtue, this is not explained until Book X. But we can use what we have
from the discussion of 1098a16–18 to reinterpret the opening statement of X.7
(1177a12–17): ‘If happiness is activity of virtue, it is reasonable that it should
be of the most superior virtue . . . the actuality of this [the theoretical intellect]
according to its proper virtue would be complete happiness.’ Contrary to
appearances, this does not identify happiness with a single activity — contem-
plation. We should understand it in light of the fact that Aristotle goes on to
consider the preliminary criteria for eudaimonia from Book I and argues that
the exercise of wisdom satisfies them better than the other kind of virtuous
activity. Hence, Aristotle can conclude on this basis that contemplation is
‘complete happiness’ in the sense that it is the more perfect version of virtuous
activity, something especially valuable that completes the other virtuous
activities constituting eudaimonia. ‘Happiness especially requires the activity
of the most superior virtue’ (227). This fits what was said about happiness in
Book I.
The intellectual life which, Aristotle goes on to argue, contains the most
superior form of happiness includes the activities of virtue of character as well
as of intellect. The second best life which contains the inferior form of happi-
ness is therefore one that does not involve the exercise of the virtues of intel-
lect: it ‘omits’ theoretical study, ‘being devoted only to the exercise of the
moral virtues.’ ‘It is reasonable of Aristotle to say that this life, too, is a happy
one, since it contains virtuous activities, activities of the type which constitute
happiness . . .’(232).
Aristotle closes his discussion of happiness by comparing the contempla-
tive happiness of the gods with human happiness, saying that ‘human life is
happy to the extent that there is something in it resembling the divine activity
of contemplation’ (234). As rational activity, morally virtuous actions bear a
kinship to divine contemplation and, because of that, they too count as
happiness.
[It is hard to see how the secondarily happy life can be happy at all on Coo-
per’s interpretation if, as he said before (225), it is particularly outrageous to
suggest that ‘someone will count as having achieved the human good just
because he has acquired and exercised the lesser virtues, without having the
highest and best’; and if the activities of all the virtues are needed for happi-
ness; and if, as he says, the activity of contemplation is especially needed for
happiness.
A similar difficulty is raised by Cooper’s statement that (235) ‘morally vir-
tuous activities . . . only count as a (kind of) eudaimonia because of some con-
nection in which they stand to the activities of contemplative study in which
the happy person also engages.’ This asserts that what matters is not some
general connection between contemplation (in general) and morally virtuous
activities that makes it true that the secondarily happy man is happy because
of his morally virtuous activities. His morally virtuous activities only count as
eudaimonia because ‘they’ — his activities — are connected to his activities
of contemplation. But if, as Cooper said, the secondarily happy man engages in
no theoretical study, and hence his morally virtuous actions stand in no relation
to any theoretical contemplation he also engages in, how can he be happy at all?
Perhaps Cooper would reply that he answers the question (235) when he
explains that, despite the passage I quoted above, the connection between con-
templation and virtuous action that matters is the general connection. He says:
Given the common character of both these types of activities [contempla-
tive and morally virtuous] as expressions of the perfection of human reason,
then, Aristotle seems to be saying: if one of them because of its kinship to
the divine activity counts as happiness, so does the other. On this view, the
whole perfection of human reason, in each and every one of its aspects,
gives us a share in that wonderful good . . . Because we can contemplate, the
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other uses of our minds, when they express virtues proper to us as human
beings, also . . . give us a share in happiness.
But if the kinship of virtuous activity to the activity of the gods explains
why morally virtuous action in an individual who does not engage in contem-
plation counts as happiness, it explains why ‘each’ activity which expresses
the perfection of human reason counts as happiness. For each of them has
some kinship to the divine activity. And this appears to produce a result which
conflicts with Cooper’s explanation of the conclusion of the function argu-
ment at 1098a16–18.
Recall that Cooper maintained that the second clause of that sentence is
added in order to make sure that the reader does not think that ‘someone will
count as having achieved the human good just because he has acquired and
exercised the lesser virtues, without having the highest and best,’ or that
someone will ‘count as having achieved happiness by exercising only one or
some of these virtues . . . ’(225). But now, if the fact that an activity bears some
kinship to the divine activity makes it the case that it counts as happiness, it
must also be true that, on its own, a single activity expressing one of the lesser
virtues counts as happiness since it does indeed bear the necessary kinship to
the divine activity. And this was what was supposed to be ruled out by the sec-
ond clause of 1098a16–18. Further, whereas we had been told (225) that Aris-
totle aims to rule out the possibility that someone can attain happiness ‘by
exercising only . . . some of the virtues,’ and Cooper emphasizes that happi-
ness requires that one exercise all of the virtues, we are now told that it is pos-
sible to attain happiness by exercising only some of these virtues.
The same point applies to Cooper’s explanation of the secondarily happy
life quoted above: ‘It is reasonable of Aristotle to say that this life, too, is a
happy one, since [my italics] it contains virtuous activities, activities of the
type which constitute happiness . . . (232)’. If the fact that a life contains virtu-
ous activities of the type which constitute happiness suffices to make it a
happy life, then people who exhibit only some of the lesser virtues must also
count as happy since their lives contain virtuous activities of the type which
constitute happiness. Likewise, the exercise of some but not all virtues now
counts as happiness whereas that was what 1098a16–18 was supposed to have
denied.
Cooper’s aim in this paper is to offer an interpretation of Aristotle’s
accounts of happiness in Books I and X which makes them cohere with one
another. But whereas the conclusion of Book I’s function argument, on his
interpretation, claims that all virtuous activities and especially contemplative
activity is necessary for happiness, his interpretation of Book X now denies
that contemplation or all virtuous activities are necessary for happiness.
Furthermore, if Cooper’s explanations (on 232 and 235) of why the virtu-
ous man who does not engage in contemplation is nevertheless happy is
assumed to be correct, why do these explanations not also show that the
non-virtuous contemplative man is happy? If the fact that a life devoid of con-
templation contains virtuous activities suffices to make it a happy life (232),
the man who engages in contemplation but not virtuous activities should also
be happy. If the kinship of one’s rational activities to the activities of the gods
makes one’s life happy, since human contemplation — ‘complete happiness’
— bears a greater resemblance than morally virtuous actions to divine con-
templation, human contemplation divorced from morally virtuous actions has
a stronger claim to count as happiness than morally virtuous actions divorced
from contemplation. So if, as Cooper holds, morally virtuous actions on their
own count as happiness for the reasons he has stated, it is even clearer that
contemplation on its own counts as happiness. The explanation of the happi-
ness of the unintellectual morally virtuous man appears to commit Aristotle to
what Cooper hoped to avoid: the happiness of the immoral contemplative man
and inconsistency with the earlier part of the Nicomachean Ethics.
The issue of the secondarily happy life is connected to some unclarity in
Cooper’s use of the term ‘eudaimonia’ as well as his use of it to refer to the
entire combination of virtuous activities. He cannot avoid the above problem
about whether all or some virtuous activities are needed for happiness in the
following way: by saying that the point of 1098a16–18 was to say that com-
plete happiness is comprised of the activities of all the virtues and does not
exist when only the activities of the lesser virtues are present; while in Book
X, similarity to divine activity explains why any activity counts as (simply)
happiness. For he has argued that by ‘complete happiness’ Aristotle means
not the sum of all kinds of virtuous activities — intellectual and moral — but
contemplation alone as opposed to morally virtuous activity (227–29). And
there is no other phrase such as ‘primary happiness’ that Aristotle ever uses
such that Cooper could hope to distinguish its meaning from the meaning he
(Cooper) gives to ‘complete happiness,’ and claim that 1098a16–18 is talking
about primary happiness (meaning all virtuous activities) rather than com-
plete happiness (contemplation) or happiness (which can be exemplified by
the non-intellectual but virtuous man).
The difficulty arises in part from Cooper’s fluctuating use of ‘happiness’ to
refer sometimes to a whole composed of elements that are activities, and at
other times to refer to the elements (activities) comprising the whole. For
example, he speaks of the morally virtuous activities in a life, i.e. the elements
of a whole, as eudaimonia.3 But according to the function argument, Cooper
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3 234: ‘. . . a certain activity, or certain activities, in that life are entitled to be called
“happiness” . . . divine and human contemplation are the only things that are entitled to be
described without qualification as eudaimonia.’ 235: ‘Aristotle’s claim seems rather to
be that those very morally virtuous activities . . . only count as a (kind of) eudaimonia
because of some connection in which they stand to the activities of contemplative study
in which the happy person also engages. These latter, by contrast, get their title to the
name eudaimonia directly… it is the happiness of the human contemplative activities
that makes morally virtuous activities also instances of happiness… if one of [these types
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had said, happiness is a combination of activities, not a single one: ‘ . . . in
describing the activities that make up happiness . . . Aristotle makes it clear
that he thinks of virtuous activities of all types — moral as well as intellec-
tual — as included within happiness, that is, as all of them constituents of it’
(221; cf. 225, 226, 229). If happiness includes, is made up of, is constituted
by, virtuous activities of all types, then none of those elements that make up
happiness can be happiness.4
Likewise, earlier Cooper said that happiness is ‘a comprehensive end,
including other goods somehow in it’ (223). A comprehensive end including
goods in itself cannot at the same time be an element in such a comprehensive
end. So what is it that ‘by its presence in a person’s life, makes him and his life
a happy one’ (228; cf. 233, n. 17)? All kinds of virtuous activities taken
together or each kind of virtuous activity? These are incompatible alterna-
tives. Cooper’s explanation of 1098a16–18 was that all are needed whereas
now, on Cooper’s reading of Book X, it turns out that not all are needed.
As Cooper says (233, n. 17), Aristotle’s description of the unintellectual
morally virtuous man as happy must be derivative on a use of ‘happiness’ that
applies to the activities that such a person engages in. So we need some expla-
nation of this prior use which Cooper does not provide and which does not
seem to be available. It cannot be ‘happiness’ as explained by Cooper since
that is composed of all virtuous activities and the life of the unintellectual
morally virtuous man lacks intellectual activities. Nor can this prior use of
‘happiness’ be identified with something like ‘secondary happiness’ used to
refer to morally virtuous activities alone as ‘complete happiness’ is applied to
contemplation alone. 5 For Cooper, to say that contemplation is ‘complete
of activity] because of its kinship to the divine activity counts as happiness, so does the
other.’ But on the same pages Cooper says that ‘virtuous activities of all types . . . are
entitled . . . to be counted as elements in our eudaimonia’ (234, my italics), and the human
good [viz. happiness] is ‘a combination of all the activities in which these [rational]
functions . . . express themselves . . .’ (235, my italics). And both uses are found in the first
sentence on p. 235: ‘Aristotle’s claim seems rather to be that those very morally virtuous
activities, which do constitute a human being’s eudaimonia [combination of activities],
only count as a (kind of) eudaimonia [element in a combination] because of some
connection in which they stand to the activities of contemplative study in which the
happy person also engages.’
4 In Cooper’s interpretation of the beginning of X.7 he offers an explanation of what
Aristotle means by saying that ‘the activity of the most complete virtue, philosophical
wisdom, is itself happiness’ (227). He says that Aristotle means that contemplation is
especially needed for happiness. But what I am now asking is: what does Cooper mean in
saying that a morally virtuous action counts as happiness? He clearly cannot offer the
same explanation here as he does of Aristotle’s apparent assertion of identity between
contemplation and happiness at the start of X.7. On p. 226 Cooper recognizes the
incompatibility between saying that happiness is a single virtuous activity and saying that
it is that activity together with all other virtuous activities.
5 Cf. (235): ‘According to this derivation, “complete happiness” is found in excellent
contemplative study, but happiness is also found in morally virtuous activity.’
happiness’ means that it most fully satisfies the preliminary criteria for happi-
ness — pleasantness, etc. (227–29). But on this use people can exemplify
complete happiness without exemplifying happiness6 and therefore without
being happy because, for example, although they engage in contemplation,
they are not morally virtuous or have suffered severe misfortune.7
We might try to say correspondingly that morally virtuous activities are
‘secondary happiness’ because they satisfy the preliminary criteria to a lesser
degree than contemplation. But as the possession of ‘complete happiness’
does not suffice for happiness, even more clearly the fact that the morally vir-
tuous man exhibits ‘secondary happiness’ cannot by itself suffice for happi-
ness or a happy man.
Cooper gets into difficulty because there is, in fact, no use of ‘eudaimonia’
in the Nicomachean Ethics corresponding to his use in which it refers to a
complex or combination of activities. It is curious to see how Cooper pushes
this idea on to the text. Consider again 1098a16–18. It has two clauses: [A] the
human good turns out to be virtuous activity of soul, and [B] if there is more
than one virtue, [the human good turns out to be activity] of the best and most
complete (teleiotaten) virtue. Cooper paraphrases this (225):
[A] happiness is virtuous human activity, and [B] if there [is] more than one
human virtue, happiness is activity of all of them, including most particu-
larly activity of the best among the virtues.
Of course, nothing in Aristotle’s statement corresponds to the italicized state-
ment. How then does Cooper justify its introduction? This he says is required
by ‘the general tenor of the argument . . . Aristotle obviously means to imply
that happiness should involve all of a human being’s natural works being done
in according with the virtue appropriate to each . . .’ (225). But even if we
accept this vague appeal to the argument’s ‘general tenor’, Cooper’s state-
ment does not justify the assertion that happiness is ‘activity of complete vir-
tue, of the sum total of the moral and intellectual virtues’ (224). For it is
possible that all of A’s ‘natural works’ should be done according to the appro-
priate virtue, without it being true that A exercises every virtue during his life.
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6 Thus, Cooper describes ‘complete happiness’ — contemplation — as an ‘element
in our happiness’ (233, my italics).
7 Near the end of his paper (234), Cooper says that human contemplation on its own
can ‘be described without qualification as [not complete eudaimonia but] eudaimonia.’
He does not explain what ‘eudaimonia’ is supposed to mean here. Previously he had said
(229) that ‘complete happiness’ refers only to ‘one of the constituents of happiness and
not happiness as a whole,’ and thought that he needed to explain away Aristotle’s
statement (at 1178b32) that contemplation is (simply) happiness. He goes on to say (235)
that contemplation is called ‘eudaimonia’ ‘directly, because of [its] intrinsic character.’
But Aristotle believes that activities count as happiness only when certain distinct
necessary conditions of happiness are satisfied. For example the non-happy immoral
contemplator (along with many other possible cases) shows that it is not true that the
intrinsic character of contemplation suffices to make it a case of happiness.
REVIEW ARTICLE — COOPER ON ANCIENT ETHICS 185
And it is far from obvious that anything that Aristotle says in the function
argument or anywhere else in the Nicomachean Ethics entails that the happy
man must exercise every virtue at some time in his life. For example, it is
hardly obvious that Aristotle thinks that someone who devotes their life to
intellectual work and achieves happiness must, in Aristotle’s opinion, at some
time in their life have exercised the virtue of courage in a battle or some other
dangerous situation.
Nor does the assumption that in order to be happy ‘all of a human being’s
natural works [must be] done in according with the virtue . . . appropriate to
each’ justify the assertion that happiness is the complex which is the activities
of all the virtues rather than the activities themselves. We have seen that Aris-
totle calls contemplation primary eudaimonia and morally virtuous activity a
secondary kind of eudaimonia. But there is no use of ‘eudaimonia’ to be
found in the Nicomachean Ethics where it refers to the complex of virtuous
activities. Since ‘eudaimonia’ can refer to either intellectual activity or virtu-
ous action, eudaimonia is a kind of genus even if, like soul, it is not a proper
genus. The definition of happiness at the conclusion of the function argument
should allow both kinds of activity to count as happiness, just as a definition
of animal should allow both a dog and a cat to count as animals. That is easily
achieved. 1098a16–18’s first clause says that happiness is activity of human
virtue. Well, contemplation is activity of intellectual virtue and moral action is
activity of human virtue. Hence, both count as eudaimonia (as long as certain
further conditions hold, as Aristotle will go on to make clear). Book X
explains that the first is perfect eudaimonia and the second is a secondary
form of eudaimonia.
In conclusion, then, I believe that Cooper has failed in his project (218) of
offering an interpretation of Aristotle’s views of happiness in Nicomachean
Ethics which would not make Book X inconsistent with the rest of the
Nicomachean Ethics by allowing that a successful thinker could be happy
without being morally virtuous; and would not construe Aristotle as taking
back in Book X, without explanation, what he had said in the earlier part of the
work. For two reasons: (1) Cooper has Book I emphasize that all kinds of vir-
tuous activities, and especially contemplation, are necessary for happiness,
whereas his understanding of Book X denies that all activities, including con-
templation, are necessary for happiness; and (2) Cooper’s explanation of
Book X’s position on the happiness of the non-intellectual virtuous man
entails that the non-virtuous intellectual man can also be happy.]
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